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Abstract
It is not an anniversary we usually celebrate and it was not any fun for the United States at the time. Fifty
years ago today, on the night of October 4, 1957, a 22-inch aluminum ball, primitive by today's standards,
sent the American public, and the policy and scientific elite, into high crisis.[1]
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CULTIVATING SCIENCE

Sputnik, Cold War Nostalgia, and 9/11
The lessons of Sputnik post-9/11

SOURCE: NASA
The harmless 184-pound radio beacon.

By Susan Lindee | Thursday, October 4th, 2007

It is not an anniversary we usually celebrate and it was not any fun for the United States at the time. Fifty years
ago today, on the night of October 4, 1957, a 22-inch aluminum ball, primitive by today’s standards, sent the
American public, and the policy and scientific elite, into high crisis.[1]
As they learned of the new Soviet satellite, Americans inside the Beltway and beyond gazed into the sky, trying to
catch a glimpse of the little machine. Lyndon Johnson, then Senate Majority leader, was hosting a barbecue on his
ranch in the Texas Hill Country, and as he and his guests looked skyward he recalled “profound shock” at a cosmos
that now felt “alien.”[2]
In many ways, 9/11 was like Sputnik. It was a shocking demonstration of technological vulnerability.On Sputnik
Night, as it came to be known, the United States seemed to have only two types of people: those looking up,
scanning the sky and those looking down for places to hide.[3] Overnight, in American culture, time came be to be
marked as “pre-Sputnik” and “post-Sputnik.”
Similarly, the attacks on New York and Washington on 9/11 “changed everything.” Commentators frequently have
compared the 2001 attacks to the Japanese bombardment on naval vessels (mostly rusty dreadnoughts built in the
first wave of an earlier arms race) moored at Pearl Harbor in December 1941. This is a legitimate, if imperfect,
comparison. But in many ways, 9/11 was more like Sputnik.[4] It was a shocking demonstration of technological
vulnerability.
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As the NASA historian Roger Launius has cogently suggested, Sputnik I was in fact not the least bit terrifying or
dangerous. Launched from the Soviet Union’s rocket testing facility in the desert near Tyuratam in the Kazakh
Republic, it had four antennae, weighed 183 pounds, and carried a small radio beacon that beeped. It circled the
earth in an elliptical orbit every 96 minutes. By the time it fell safely to earth in January 1958, however, this
harmless little ball had profoundly transformed U.S. political and techno-scientific culture.
To the surprise of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who initially viewed the launch as having only limited
political significance, American newspaper headlines proclaimed Sputnik a horrifying Soviet triumph. Khrushchev
promptly corrected course and began exploiting the delightfully unexpected propaganda potential of space
exploration.[5] Sputnik 2, with its living inhabitant, a dog named Laika, was aloft within a month.
Meanwhile, the U.S. effort to launch its own satellite in December 1957 was a dismal, embarrassing, public failure.
The Vanguard Rocket lifted briefly from the launchpad at Cape Canaveral, as hundreds of reporters watched, and
then exploded. It was not until January 1958 that the United States successfully launched its first satellite,
Explorer I.
Sputnik jump-started some of the most paranoid excesses of the Cold War and threatened the image of the United
States around the world. Enemies and rivals were gleeful at the humiliation of the hegemon.[6] Allies were
frightened and in need of reassurance. In that bleak fall, the nation that first built atomic weaponry began to
seriously contemplate the prospect of nuclear blowback and technological inferiority in a new, urgent “space race.”
So today, 50 years on, what’s to remember, or to celebrate?
Sputnik, for all its terrifying consequences, became an impetus for national self-doubt, and for a critical
examination of science policy and funding, the state of American technology and the resources devoted to primary
and secondary school education. It produced a techno-scientific turn, a wave of new initiatives for space, as well as
general curricular reform and heightened support of science, technology, and medicine across the board. It led to
the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in July 1958 (after months of debate about how
such an agency should be structured) and to a curricular revolution.
The National Science Foundation, facing constant budget cutbacks from an unenthusiastic Congress in the 1950s,
suddenly found eager support for a small program intended to improve science teaching in U.S. elementary and
high schools. The teaching program budget jumped from $600,000 to $6,000,000, with “Sputnik” the keyword in
the hearings.[7] Even the teaching of Darwinian evolution, which had languished for decades in American public
schools after the 1925 Scopes monkey trial, became a public priority with the passage of the National Defense
Education Act in 1958.[8]
Looking back, the policy and scientific crisis provoked by Sputnik can almost provoke nostalgia for the good old
days, when teaching evolutionary theory to eighth graders seemed important to national defense.
Somehow, the most complex security threat the country has ever faced has not produced the broad,
comprehensive military, technological, and scientific alliances that grew out of Sputnik.
And how about today? In the bleak fall of 2001, the world’s dominant military forces were shown to be
inexplicably useless against enemies armed with box cutters and suicidal ideation. All the nuclear weapons in the
world could not have prevented the events of that terrible day. 9/11 was therefore, like Sputnik, an opportunity for
the United States as a nation to engage in self-doubt.
How could the nation be made more secure? Was more hardware the key? More intelligence? More support for
education or international development? And how could experts of all kinds, in medicine, the social sciences,
engineering, and the biological and physical sciences, be mobilized to help the United States manage these baffling
new forms of violence and aggression?
Instead, an administration that cannot even keep the National Academy of Sciences as an ally has resolutely
chosen the opposite of self doubt. An NAS report in 2005 is filled with striking anecdotes that suggest the
administration is anti-science.[9] And over the last six years, relations between the administration and leading
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scientific organizations have reached an abysmal low. The Union of Concerned Scientists has documented “the
Bush Administration’s misuse of science.”[10] The Federation of American Scientists has angrily responded to the
government case against microbiologist Thomas Butler with a call to arms.[11]
Somehow, the most complex security threat the country has ever faced has not produced the broad,
comprehensive military, technological, and scientific alliances that grew out of Sputnik. There is today no shortage
of federal support for new weapons systems, for the “killing technologies” that the historian David Edgerton
suggests have dominated technological innovation for a century.[12] But taking scientific and medical expertise
seriously on other issues has been a different matter. The response to Sputnik, sometimes characterized as
“hysteria,” can look positively enlightened in comparison to the response to 9/11.
History is not, of course, the chronicle of what happened in the past. It is rather the selective reconstruction of
what can be remembered, recognized, and understood in one’s own time. In 1957, Sputnik seemed so astonishing
that it defined a break in the texture of time, from pre to post. It looks like much less to us now. But we can see
things about those events that would have been less obvious to participants. We can see, for example, some
alternative perspectives on evolving relationships between scientists and the state, relationships that continue to
vex us today, and to matter now more than ever.
Susan Lindee is a Professor in the Department of History and Sociology of Science at the University of
Pennsylvania.
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1. Recent scholarly studies of the impact of Sputnik include Asif Siddiqi, Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge,
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2000); Roger D. Launius, John M. Logsdon and Robert W. Smith, eds.,
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account at http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/sputorig.html.
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1957-2001,” Canadian Review of American Studies 34:1 (2004): 83-103.
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8. See discussion of the development of the Biological Science Curriculum Study, Randy Moore, 2001. “The
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10. http://webexhibits.org/bush/1.html.
11. http://www.fas.org/butler/. See also an excellent report on the Butler case in the Cleveland Plain Dealer at
http://www.cleveland.com/plague/.
12. For a daily tally of defense spending, and descriptions of each project, see
http://www.militaryindustrialcomplex.com/contracts-by-branch-of-service.asp . See Edgerton’s chapter on all
forms of killing technologies, a category which for him includes slaughterhouses, pesticides, weapons, and the
industrialized killing facilities that were critical to the Holocaust. David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old:
Technology and Global History Since 1900 (Oxford University Press, 2007) pp 160-183.
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